Our aim is to clarify the conceptual foundations of the philosophical research program variously referred to by the names 'epistemic decision theory' and 'epistemic consequentialism'. This has been done before, 1 but we think there's profit in doing it again. In particular, we will argue that there are in fact two different projects rather than one, and only confusion can come from conflating them. We'll show that the nearly universally held norm we'll call Propriety cannot be true, at least not as a part of epistemic decision theory as we think that project ought to be understood. Since so many results in this burgeoning literature depend on that norm, our aim is unfortunately also destructive. As we'll argue, though, we should have been suspicious all along of the high-powered results that allegedly purely (epistemic) decision-theoretic principles have seemed to deliver. In addition to conceptual clarity, we think that this investigation will also illuminate the substantive normative foundations of any project like epistemic decision theory.
to have credences representable by Cr.
Each premise is initially plausible; we'll discuss them in turn.
With P1, we first need to clarify 'epistemic act'. Minimally, it is sufficient for something to be an epistemic act if it's an adjustment or adoption of a degree of confidence in a proposition or propositions. So, for example, making your credence higher that Al Franken will win an election after viewing a debate will count as an epistemic act. That is, strictly, all we need to say for the argument to go through; we can leave the rest of the notion intuitive. Another example, however, might prove important for later. Upon considering new evidence, one might suspend their judgment in p, where we interpret this as choosing a credence function that is undefined for p.
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The justification of P1 is simple. It's a maximizing principle, much like the familiar decision-theoretic injunction to maximize one's expected utility, given a set of choices that one can make. The reasonableness of that principle should make P1 seem reasonable, too. But we would like to emphasize that this is a substantive commitment; if you favor some different decision rules, e.g., minimax, you won't find the requirement to be immodest even prima facie compelling. Because we think that rules that enjoin maximizing expected utility are good ones, we won't press this any further.
P2 follows from the assumption that S is modest as a result of being representable by Cr.
P3 is perhaps the most obviously controversial of the premises. We have it and the corresponding part of P1 because we know that there are some people who think that the rational 'ought' implies some sort of 'can'. 7 We're less sure that we need it. Even so, though we expect that this is a place some people will resist the argument for immodesty, we will not ourselves focus on it.
P4 follows from the fact that an agent cannot have two (different) credence functions 6 This might not be the right analysis of suspension of judgment. See Friedman (2013) for discussion. For this paper, we're more interested in partial credence functions than suspension of judgment, at least if that analysis turns out to be incorrect; we use the phrase 'suspension of judgment' merely for convenience.
7 See, e.g., Wedgwood (2013) .
at once. Cr and Cr must be different, since they have different expected epistemic utilities, given I. Of course, it might be that one can have imprecise credences, where an imprecise credence function is a set of credence functions-but this is just to say that the agent doesn't have (isn't representable by) any precise credence function in particular.
We claim that the rational requirement to be immodest that this argument motivates comes to this:
Immodesty. All agents are rationally forbidden from having credence functions and epistemic utility functions that render that agent modest.
As we conceive of it, this is a wide-scope requirement. It says that a person ought not to have an epistemic utility function and credence function that together conspire to render them immodest. They can fix the problem by changing how they value truth and disvalue falsehood, or by changing their credences. Of course, there might be other rational requirements that together entail that, say, the Brier score is the rationally required epistemic utility function. But by itself, the requirement of immodesty imposes no such strong constraints. This contrasts with some other formulations in the literature.
Joyce (2009), for example, says that the only admissible epistemic utility function with which to (epistemically) evaluate an agent will be be ones that render that agent immodest in cases where the agent's credences are "clearly rational". This doesn't require that the agent herself have that epistemic utility function. The problem is that if the agent doesn't have the theorist's epistemic utility function, then they won't necessarily be doing worse than they could by their own lights. A version of the Lewis-Gibbard argument that didn't tie the relevant epistemic utility functions to the agent herself wouldn't be plausible. This is because what is so compelling about the Lewis-Gibbard argument is that the agent can see, by her own lights, that she has superior alternatives to her current credence function. It is relatively uncontroversial that the agent's own epistemic utility function is relevant to the evaluation of "acts"; it is far more controversial, and requires independent argument, to think that some theorist's epistemic utility function matters for the evaluation of someone else. So, for the Lewis-Gibbard argument to work using a different epistemic utility function than the agent's, we need a separate argument establishing that the theorist's epistemic utility function is normatively relevant for the agent under evaluation. But if the feature that makes the theorist's epistemic utility function normatively relevant is that it makes the agent's credences immodest, the LewisGibbard argument would simply beg the question.
For these reasons, we will assume that agents have epistemic utility functions. The
Lewis argument shows that at least one very prominent strain of epistemic decision theory conceives of it as an internalist's enterprise, and that enterprise only works at all if agents have epistemic utility functions in the same way that agents have utility functions more generally. In the same way that an agent's desires-both their contents and their strengths-determine, likely not uniquely, a utility function, we would like to say that an agent's desires for believing truths and disbelieving falsehoods determine, likely not uniquely, an epistemic utility function. Their behavior will reveal these utilities, at least in part: with respect to the truth, how risk averse or seeking are these agents? So, going forward, we will assume just the same kind of realism about epistemic utilities that some decision theorists and ethicists assume about utility functions generally.
Another kind of argument for Immodesty is abductive: it shows that we can derive a lot of desirable epistemic principles, so long as we can appeal to Immodesty. For example, Joyce (1998) famously argues for probabilism (the requirement that credence functions be probability functions); Greaves and Wallace (2006) and Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010) argue for conditionalization; and Pettigrew (2016) argues for, among other principles, versions of the Principal Principle and the Principle of Indifference. As we said, we'll say why we don't find this kind of argument compelling in a later section.
Those are the major arguments for Immodesty; we'll have more to say about them in a moment. We now want to introduce the second, related claim. But first, we'll need another bit of technology:
Definition 3. An epistemic scoring rule I is proper iff for all possible probability functions P r and finite sets of possibilities S, and every credence function Cr, EI(P r, P r, I) ≤ EI(P r, Cr, I). functions an agent might learn is identical with the chances at the time. So, no probabilistically coherent function ought to be ruled impermissible simply by using a given epistemic utility function. Thus, all epistemic utility functions that are acceptable to use to evaluate credence functions' rationality will be proper.
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R1 is a minimal constraint on epistemic utility functions; epistemic consequentialism would simply not be plausible as a theory of epistemic rationality were R1 false. With R2, there's room to quibble about the proper form of the Principal Principle, since you might prefer Hall (1994) 's New Principal Principle, or something similar. We're confident the choice of the form it takes doesn't much affect whether the argument works. In any case, neither R1 nor R2 are where we will be focusing our attention. R3 is intuitively plausible, since there don't seem to be a priori restrictions on what the chances at a given time could be.
Though this argument is, again, prima facie plausible, we think it pretty clearly fails.
We have three problems. They all target R3.
To see the first problem, note that there are probabilistically coherent credence functions that satisfy the following: for some p, Cr(p|Ch t (p) = x) = x. They will not be credence functions that the Principal Principle can rationalize; such a credence function cannot possibly be obtained by learning what the objective chance function is for an agent who satisfies the Principal Principle. So, they can (and should) be ruled out a priori. So, not every coherent credence function can be made clearly rational for some agent by the Principal Principle, and so the argument fails.
To be clear: we are giving an argument against R3, i.e., against the idea that any probabilistic coherence functions might be the clearly rational ones to have. Here's an oversimple example demonstrating the general point: the agent assigns probability 1 to the proposition expressed by 'Ch t (p) = 1', but assigns probability 0 to p and 1 to ¬p (and 1 to p ∨ ¬p, etc.). Assuming p is the only atomic proposition in the agent's algebra, such an agent is probabilistically coherent, but obviously this credence function cannot be made rational by the Principal Principle. Of course, it can be ruled as irrational -9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing us to clarify the statement of the Joyce argument.
indeed, probably because it so grossly violates the Principal Principle itself. But it is a counterexample to R3, because it is a probabilistically coherent credence function that cannot be clearly the rational one to have, or at least cannot be because it is made so by Either there are some objective chances that this proposition can't (now) have (e.g., 1),
or it can have any objective chance, but-for familiar Cartesian reasons-it wouldn't be rational for any agent to be certain in it. There are also, of course, more direct Moorean analogues, for example that it's raining and I have very low credence that it's raining.
Any of these would suffice to give examples of credence functions that are notoriously coherent but irrational to have as one's own. It's important to note that these kinds of Moorean credal assignments are what would be supported by the objective chance function via the Principal Principle. There could be facts about your neurophysiology that make it very likely that you will have low credence in it raining in some cases where it is in fact raining. So, once again, there are minimally coherent credence functions that cannot be rationalized in the way the argument requires.
10 Propriety's basic thought is that no probabilistically coherent function ought to be rationally disincentivized by one's epistemic utility function. Our rejection of this argument, then, amounts to this: that case has not been made. There might be other ways to make it, but this very general way won't work. In section 3 we will provide a general argument for thinking that anything like Joyce's argument here will fail, but here, our only aim was to attack premise R3, and thereby Joyce's argument. We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us to clarify our response to Joyce's argument.
Here's our last problem. It's generally agreed that, where p's truthmakers lie entirely before t, Ch t (p) = 0 or 1. So, p =<Abraham Lincoln was assassinated>. There is now no way to learn that Ch t (p) = x, where x is neither 0 nor 1. So, there is no way for the Principal Principle to rationalize assigning non-extremal credence to p for agents like us.
More generally, there is no agent for which the Principal Principle can rationalize every coherent credence function, since for any agent in worlds at all like ours, there will be propositions whose truthmakers lie entirely in the past.
For all these reasons, we're not optimistic about this argument's chances. But it does highlight some of the more important lessons that we take to be central to why Propriety is misguided. In the next section, we'll say what, exactly, we take these to be, so that a simple repair is not likely forthcoming.
We think that this argument (R1, ...) hasn't been put in its most general form. What's really required is some expert deference principle, and that need not be any form of the Principal Principle. So, for example, if you treat Dumbledore as a guru, then you ought to satisfy something like this constraint:
11 And if you think Dumbledore could, in principle, have any coherent credence function, then you get an argument with an identical structure. Moreover, our first and third objections wouldn't succeed against this argument. That's not to say it doesn't have its own problems.
First, the second objection still very much applies. Second, a version of the first worry still applies, e.g., your learning that Dumbledore assigns x to p cannot rationalize the coherent credence function where you thereby assign y = x to p. Also, by being an epistemic agent, rather than an abstraction, it becomes less plausible that the guru can justifiably have conditional credences that violate certain evidentiary norms related to, for instance, induction. So, while we think the generalization is worth pointing out and avoids some versions of some of these problems, it doesn't ultimately help.
So far our arguments have been pretty narrow, focusing only on rebutting Joyce's argument for Propriety. It's worth worrying whether there is, nevertheless, a more general reason to go in for Propriety: it is a way of guaranteeing that agents always satisfy 11 For discussion of this sort of terminology, see Elga (2007 
Rational Mistakes
Mistakes in an agent's past can cause trouble down the line, both for the agent who has made the mistakes and for the theorist trying to give recommendations for the agent's beliefs. Suppose our agent S has an update policy U , and in response to experience E fails to update her past credences Cr S to the credences recommended by U , Cr * S , instead adopting Cr S . This might happen as the result of a "glitch" in S's cognitive functioning, or of some sort of doxastic or epistemic akrasia-endorsing a doxastic or epistemic "act" but doing something else incompatible. Suppose S is apprised of this-she realizes she failed to update by U . It seems it is permissible to simply switch from Cr S to Cr * S .
Propriety does not allow this. Thus, Propriety is false. That is the argument we will defend in this section.
In a little more detail, here it is: S1. Suppose S has Cr S at t and gets total evidence E at t > t, but fails to use the rationally permissible update policy U that they endorse, and so has Cr S at t ; S uses some other updating procedure U . It's important that we are criticizing Practical Propriety and not a practical analogue of Immodesty. The reason is that a practical analogue of Immodesty is just the normative requirement to maximize expected utility. We think that might be a correct normative principle. Our issue with Practical Propriety is that we don't think it's a functional constraint on admissible utility functions that they necessarily render every probabilistically coherent agent practically immodest. Thanks to a reviewer for pressing us here.
S2. Suppose Cr
17 See, e.g., Feldman (2006) . 18 For more discussion of these points, see Meacham and Weisberg (2011) and Easwaran (2014) .
One factor is sheer laziness. This is distinct from computational intractability. Suppose there are just two options, A and B, which differ only in that A is F and B is ¬F .
And suppose the relevant agent knows their utilities (and, if you like, their credences) perfectly well. They might still decide that it's not worth the trouble to compute the expected value of A as opposed to B. Then they might intend A, even though B in fact has more expected utility. You might worry that the options are not properly described:
really they're A with calculation, B with calculation, A without calculation, and B without calculation; and either A or B without calculation is clearly superior to A or B with calculation-though how much would, of course, be impossible to know in a way that retains genuine optionality. Perhaps, though we think people often forego calculation where it is expectedly more beneficial than not calculating. This might be a sort of akrasia; if so, it is a very common kind. Indeed, akrasia of a more general kind can cause (or constitute) our intending a less good outcome in expectation.
Not just akrasia does that, though. Agents sometimes accept decision rules besides ones that enjoin them to maximize expected utility. This choice itself might be irrational, 19 and it might cause them to make subsequent irrational choices down the line.
But surely it is possible. So if we would like to offer rational criticism of those people for these reasons, then we should not accept Practical Propriety. It should be possible to criticize an agent for failing to maximize expected utility relative to their actual utilities, while allowing that those utilities are rationally acceptable.
Finally, an agent might simply not know what their utilities are. For example, you might get excellent evidence that you intrinsically desire something: for example, knowledge of number theory. But then you try it, and you realize you never actually wanted it; you thought you did, because people you admired wanted it, and you thought, and perhaps hoped, you were like them, as you knew you were in many other respects. Failure to know our own desires is unfortunately common, and not at all always a mistake of rationality: our evidence is sometimes misleading, just as evidence is about anything else. So, we would misevaluate people if we required that rational agents' utility functions always 19 For the thought that it is irrational, see Titelbaum (2015) .
have them maximizing expected utility. Now, perhaps this is a problem with practical
Practical Decision Theory and Ethics, Epistemic Decision Theory and Epistemology
We think there is a more general lesson to be learned from this discussion. We said in our introduction that philosophers have used 'epistemic decision theory' and 'epistemic consequentialism' to refer to the same project. But clearly 'decision theory' and 'consequentialism' refer to quite different projects. A person might fully comply with decision theory's recommendations while being a morally terrible person. This is not so with any correct ethical theory. 21 Decision theory is, by design, much less substantive than ethical theory. This is what gives rise to its generally internalist character, since its recommendations are meant to make sense given arbitrary, or almost arbitrary, points of view; not so for consequentialism. A similar distinction, we think, captures the difference between epistemic decision theory and epistemology, at least as we propose now to use those terms.
Here's a different way to put these points. It's no problem for decision theory if it recommends that a serial killer kill; it very much would be an at least prima facie problem if ethical theories delivered that result in normal cases. The point is just that decision theory is radically internalist: it takes credence functions and utility functions for granted-modulo certain consistency requirements, such as, perhaps, transitivity of 
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There's an analogous distinction between epistemic decision theory and epistemology, we think. The burden of this section will be to convince you of that. As we said, decision theory is, at its very heart, internalist. This means that its recommendations have to be something that speak to the agents themselves, as their points of view in fact work. If a theorist thinks some option would be better for them, but if there's no route from the agent's actual coherent credences and utilities to that option, then the theorist's view is of no consequence as far as decision theory goes. We should emphasize that we are not committing ourselves to reasons internalism, 24 or even, necessarily, internalism about rationality. This is just how we think the project of decision theory ought to be delineated. And at first glance, epistemic decision theory seems to respect this, at least more than any other epistemic theory that we?ve seen, at least as traditionally understood.
For one, its recommendations are formed by taking expectations of credences and (epistemic) utilities. That is a real and important similarity. Also, the Lewis argument has a decidedly internalist feel. But, as we've seen, the theory is not internalist enough. And there are different ways in which it isn't internalist enough, depending on certain choices the theorist might make. Some epistemic decision theorists have imposed on individuals epistemic utilities that, not only do they not have, but they seem not to be rationally required to have, either-such as the proper utility functions. But as we saw, even that's not enough, because the agent can fail to be aware of their own epistemic utilities, even in broad outline. Internalist motivations cannot deliver anything like Propriety. And they shouldn't, because nothing like Propriety is true in the practical case: it would be unreasonable to assume even relatively ideal agents always succeed in matching their intentions to the theory's recommendations. 25 So, even if Propriety can allow the epistemic 23 We are aware of some people who try to derive ethics from decision theory (or at least from game theory), like Gauthier (1986) , but we are convinced that that cannot be done. If you do think it can, however, you'll be far less interested in the distinction we make in this section, but we think sufficiently many people share our suspicion to motivate what we'll say. 24 See Williams (1981) . 25 A reviewer objects: this looks like a criticism of a practical analogue to Immodesty rather than of Practical Propriety, because it looks like our criticism is of agents' actual choices rather than their utility functions. But this appearance is a little misleading. Our concern is that it be possible to criticize agents decision theorist to make the intuitively correct epistemic criticisms of agents who, say, have non-probabilistic credence functions, we just don't think that's the theory's job, any more than we think decision theory should allow us to criticize coherent killers and sadists.
Of course, coherence matters even in decision theory, you might think. Money pump arguments certainly seem and are often taken to establish that agents ought to have transitive preferences. We suspect that really these are motivated as modeling assumptions, or as adequacy constraints on a theory that can actually recommend behavior, but either way, our problem is not with probabilism, even as a constraint on input credences to an epistemic decision theory. Rather, our problem is with using internalist arguments to motivate a derivation of probabilism with Propriety. So, we're not against coherence constraints, even the ones that epistemic decision theorists have argued for; we just think their arguments are not motivated by epistemic decision theory, but if the constraints are good, they need independent motivation. So, what's left of epistemic decision theory without Propriety? Well, what's left is just the epistemic analogue of decision theory. It won't give as many structural constraints as we might have hoped for, but we didn't hope for similar constraints in the practical case for good reason: decision theory is very much a garbage in, garbage out kind of a theory. We're advocating seeing epistemic decision theory in the same way; we think that's what the project's motivations deliver, and that anything else is too substantive. This means that epistemic decision theory is not, as some have seemed to hope, a replacement for epistemology, any more than practical decision theory is a replacement for ethics. But just as many doubt the derivation of ethics from decision or game theory, we doubt the derivation of epistemology from decision theory. We wish to emphasize that we don't think we should simply take every agent's actual epistemic utility function for granted-there are almost certainly substantive, rational requirements on those for failing to maximize expected utility, which is made impossible by requiring for the evaluation of agents' intentions practically proper utility functions. So our criticism is, in the first instance, of a requirement on utility functions, though it is true that that criticism derives from our wish to criticize intentions or choices. Recall from footnote 14 that we think the practical analogue of Immodesty, conceived of as a rational or normative requirement on (now) credence-utility-intention triples, might very well be right. We thank the reviewer for this objection. utility functions that a person might fail to conform to. But, we do think that these constraints ought somehow to be internalistically motivated. We take no issue with the part of epistemic decision theory that meets those demands. In particular, there might be rational constraints on epistemic utility functions that correspond to transitivity and independence in practical decision theory. We thus do not reject the epistemic decision theorists' approach to accuracy measures in every particular; our target is the extremely popular Propriety. In epistemology, by contrast, it is an open and much debated question whether epistemic constraints must be internalistically motivated.
There are other advantages to our way of thinking. For example, we think that this way of thinking about things allows us to avoid some problems that have proved very difficult for epistemic decision theorists recently. First, there's the notorious problem of epistemic bribes.
26 So, take the following case:
Converted scientist. Clara is an atheist scientist who seeks a grant from a religious organization. The grant agency will only give grants to fund Christians' research, and Clara knows that she wouldn't be able to fool them. Despite the fact that she's thought long and hard about the issue and knows that, on balance, the evidence strongly supports atheism over Christianity, she also knows that this will cause her belief set to be filled with more accurate beliefs than she had before that.
The epistemic decision theorist who aspires to epistemology will have a hard time with this case, because she will recommend that Clara believe in the Christian God, which is standardly taken to be the wrong result. But our epistemic decision theorist need say no such thing; she can say that, although the true epistemological theory would say that in her evidential position Clara ought not to believe in God, she would get more of what she epistemically wants by doing so. So Converted scientist would no longer be a counterexample, nor would the rest of the epistemic bribe cases. This is similar to how an ethical theory might have deontological restrictions that would be out of place in a decision theory.
26 See, e.g., Firth (1998 ), Berker (2013 , Greaves (2013) , and Konek and Levinstein (forthcoming).
More generally, the epistemic decision theorist need not worry about attacks based on evidentialism, namely the theory that an agent epistemically ought to fit their credences to the evidence, however that's to be spelled out exactly. 27 So, it would avoid problems based on evidentialism that already exist in the literature even assuming Propriety, 28 and problems with evidentialism that arise from having improper epistemic utility functions.
That is, when an agent has an improper epistemic utility function, our version of epistemic decision theory will, in some cases depending on the exact function, recommend changing credences but not in response to any new evidence. So, for example, the absolute value epistemic utility function recommends extremal credences in all propositions to which one does not initially give 0.5 credence. But this is again no problem if switching credences in that way is bad by epistemology's lights, even if it secures more of the agent's own epistemic good, at least by their own lights.
Finally, the epistemic decision theorist can give no reason to rule out the following probabilistically coherent priors: .99 to some contingent p conditional on every proposition q. We're not absolutely positive epistemology should rule those out, but we do think epistemic decision theory can't, and so anyone who thinks that epistemology can be derived exclusively by using epistemic decision theory cannot rule those out as epistemically bad. This is just the same as the situations we began by describing: decision theory can't tell agents not to prefer not killing, but ethics might be able to. So, we have yet another reason to distinguish epistemic decision theory and epistemology.
We suspect there are many other reasons, but we think we've made our case. The internalist motivations for epistemic decision theory fit terribly with what it has been used for so far. Moreover, the analogy with practical decision theory should lead us to expect that there is a difference between epistemic decision theory and epistemology. Finally, we can avoid or dissolve some problems that have seemed intractable for epistemic decision theory as it's been practiced. That is, once again, not to say that the results the epistemic decision theorist has argued for cannot be right, only that they ought not to be argued for in that way.
27 See, e.g., Feldman and Conee (1985) . 28 See, e.g., Easwaran and Fitelson (2012) .
